From: "Legal Information Institute [LII]" <Legal_Information_Institute_LII@mail.vresp.com>
Date: Jun 18, 2015 11:53 AM
Subject: Supreme Court Bulletin for Thursday, June 18, 2015
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The following information has just arrived via the LII's direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. A list of links for today's material is followed by the syllabus for any case which had one.
Contents
- OHIO v. CLARK (13-1352 Syllabus)
- DAVIS v. AYALA (13-1428 Syllabus)
- BRUMFIELD v. CAIN (13-1433 Syllabus)
- REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT (13-502 Syllabus)
- WALKER v. TEXAS DIV., SONS OF (14-144 Syllabus)
- McFADDEN v. UNITED STATES (14-378 Syllabus)
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Alito] | Opinion [Scalia] | Concurrence [Thomas] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
OHIO v. CLARK
certiorari to the supreme court of ohio
No. 13–1352. Argued March 2, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015
Respondent Darius Clark sent his girlfriend away to engage in prostitution while he cared for her 3-year-old son L. P. and 18-month-old daughter A. T. When L. P.'s preschool teachers noticed marks on his body, he identified Clark as his abuser. Clark was subsequently tried on multiple counts related to the abuse of both children. At trial, the State introduced L. P.'s statements to his teachers as evidence of Clark's guilt, but L. P. did not testify. The trial court denied Clark's motion to exclude the statements under the Sixth Amendment 's Confrontation Clause. A jury convicted Clark on all but one count. The state appellate court reversed the conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed.
Held: The introduction of L. P.'s statements at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Pp. 4–12.
(a) This Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , held that the Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the introduction of "testimonial" statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is "unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." A statement qualifies as testimonial if the "primary purpose" of the conversation was to "creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U. S. 344 . In making that "primary purpose" determination, courts must consider "all of the relevant circumstances." Ibid. "Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause." Id., at 359. But that does not mean that the Confrontation Clause bars every statement that satisfies the "primary purpose" test. The Court has recognized that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the founding. See Giles v. California, 554 U. S. 353 –359; Crawford, 541 U. S., at 56, n. 6, 62. Thus, the primary purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Considering all the relevant circumstances, L. P.'s statements were not testimonial. L. P.'s statements were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark's prosecution. They occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse. L. P.'s teachers asked questions aimed at identifying and ending a threat. They did not inform the child that his answers would be used to arrest or punish his abuser. L. P. never hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors. And the conversation was informal and spontaneous. L. P.'s age further confirms that the statements in question were not testimonial because statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. As a historical matter, moreover, there is strong evidence that statements made in circumstances like these were regularly admitted at common law. Finally, although statements to individuals other than law enforcement officers are not categorically outside the Sixth Amendment 's reach, the fact that L. P. was speaking to his teachers is highly relevant. Statements to individuals who are not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than those given to law enforcement officers. Pp. 7–10.
(c) Clark's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Mandatory reporting obligations do not convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed at gathering evidence for prosecution. It is irrelevant that the teachers' questions and their duty to report the matter had the natural tendency to result in Clark's prosecution. And this Court's Confrontation Clause decisions do not determine whether a statement is testimonial by examining whether a jury would view the statement as the equivalent of in-court testimony. Instead, the test is whether a statement was given with the "primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony." Bryant, supra, at 358. Here, the answer is clear: L. P.'s statements to his teachers were not testimonial. Pp. 11–12.
137 Ohio St. 3d 346, 2013–Ohio–4731, 999 N. E. 2d 592, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Alito] | Concurrence [Kennedy] | Concurrence [Thomas] | Dissent [Sotomayor] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
DAVIS, ACTING WARDEN v. AYALA
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 13–1428. Argued March 3, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015
During jury selection in respondent Ayala's murder trial, Ayala, who is Hispanic, objected that seven of the prosecution's peremptory challenges were impermissibly race-based under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 . The judge permitted the prosecution to disclose its reasons for the strikes outside the presence of the defense and concluded that the prosecution had valid, race-neutral reasons for the strikes. Ayala was eventually convicted and sentenced to death. On appeal, the California Supreme Court analyzed Ayala's challenge under both Batson and its state-law analogue, concluding that it was error, as a matter of state law, to exclude Ayala from the hearings. The court held, however, that the error was harmless under state law and that, if a federal error occurred, it too was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 . Ayala subsequently pressed his claims in federal court. There, the District Court held that even if the ex parte proceedings violated federal law, the state court's harmlessness finding could not be overturned because it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit disagreed and granted Ayala habeas relief. The panel majority held that the ex parte proceedings violated Ayala's federal constitutional rights and that the error was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 , as to at least three of the seven prospective jurors.
Held: Any federal constitutional error that may have occurred by excluding Ayala's attorney from part of the Batson hearing was harmless. Pp. 9–29.
(a) Even assuming that Ayala's federal rights were violated, he is entitled to habeas relief only if the prosecution cannot demonstrate harmlessness. Glebe v. Frost, 574 U. S. ___, ___. Under Brecht, federal habeas petitioners "are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.' " 507 U. S., at 637. Because Ayala seeks federal habeas corpus relief, he must meet the Brecht standard, but that does not mean, as the Ninth Circuit thought, that a state court's harmlessness determination has no significance under Brecht. The Brecht standard subsumes the requirements that §2254(d) imposes when a federal habeas petitioner contests a state court's determination that a constitutional error was harmless under Chapman. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112 . But Brecht did not abrogate the limitation on federal habeas relief that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 plainly sets out. There is no dispute that the California Supreme Court held that any federal error was harmless under Chapman, and this decision was an "adjudication on the merits" of Ayala's claim. Accordingly, a federal court cannot grant Ayala relief unless the state court's rejection of his claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Pp. 9–12.
(b) Any federal constitutional error was harmless with respect to all seven prospective jurors. Pp. 12–28.
(1) The prosecution stated that it struck Olanders D., an African-American man, because it was concerned that he could not impose the death penalty and because of the poor quality of his responses. As the trial court and State Supreme Court found, the record amply supports the prosecution's concerns, and Ayala cannot establish that the ex parte hearing prejudiced him. The Ninth Circuit misunderstood the role of a federal court in a habeas case. That role is not to conduct de novo review of factual findings and substitute the federal court's own opinions for the determination made on the scene by the trial judge. Pp. 14–18.
(2) The prosecution stated that it struck Gerardo O., a Hispanic man, because he had a poor grasp of English, his answers suggested an unwillingness to impose the death penalty, and he did not appear to get along with other jurors. Each of these reasons was amply supported by the record, and there is no basis for finding that the absence of defense counsel affected the trial judge's evaluation of the strike. Ayala cannot establish that the ex parte hearing actually prejudiced him or that no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court's application of Chapman. Once again, the Ninth Circuit's decision was based on a misapplication of basic rules regarding harmless error. The inquiry is not whether the federal habeas court could definitively say that the defense could make no winning arguments, but whether the evidence in the record raised "grave doubt[s]" about whether the trial judge would have ruled differently. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U. S. 432 . That standard was not met in this case. Pp. 18–24.
(3) The prosecution stated that it struck Robert M., a Hispanic man, because it was concerned that he could not impose the death penalty and because he had followed a controversial murder trial. Not only was the Ninth Circuit incorrect to suppose that the presence of Ayala's counsel at the hearing would have made a difference in the trial court's evaluation of the strike, but the Ninth Circuit failed to mention that defense counsel specifically addressed the issue during voir dire and reminded the judge that Robert M. also made several statements favorable to the death penalty. Thus, the trial judge heard counsel's arguments and concluded that the record supplied a legitimate basis for the prosecution's concern. That defense counsel did not have the opportunity to repeat that argument does not create grave doubt about whether the trial court would have decided the issue differently. Pp. 24–26.
(4) With regard to Ayala's Batson objection about the four remaining prospective jurors who were struck, he does not come close to establishing "actual prejudice" under Brecht or that no fairminded jurist could agree with the California Supreme Court's decision that excluding counsel was harmless. Pp. 26–28.
756 F. 3d 656, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., filed concurring opinions. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Sotomayor] | Dissent [Thomas] | Dissent [Alito] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BRUMFIELD v. CAIN, WARDEN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 13–1433. Argued March 30, 2015 —Decided June 18, 2015
Petitioner Kevan Brumfield was convicted of murder in a Louisiana court and sentenced to death before this Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually disabled, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 . Implementing Atkins' mandate, see id., at 317, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that an evidentiary hearing is required when a defendant "provide[s] objective factors" sufficient to raise a " 'a reasonable ground' " to believe that he has an intellectual disability, which the court defined as "(1) subaverage intelligence, as measured by objective standardized IQ tests; (2) significant impairment in several areas of adaptive skills; and (3) manifestations of this neuro-psychological disorder in the developmental stage." State v. Williams, 2001–1650 (La. 11/1/02), 831 So. 2d 835, 857, 861, 854.
Soon after the Williams decision, Brumfield amended his pending state postconviction petition to raise an Atkins claim. Seeking an evidentiary hearing, he pointed to evidence introduced at sentencing that he had an IQ of 75, had a fourth-grade reading level, had been prescribed numerous medications and treated at psychiatric hospitals as a child, had been identified as having a learning disability, and had been placed in special education classes. The trial court dismissed Brumfield's petition without holding a hearing or granting funds to conduct additional investigation. Brumfield subsequently sought federal habeas relief. The District Court found that the state court's rejection of Brumfield's claim was both "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by" this Court and "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U. S. C. §§2254(d)(1), (2). The court went on to determine that Brumfield was intellectually disabled. The Fifth Circuit found that Brumfield's petition failed to satisfy either of §2254(d)'s requirements and reversed.
Held: Because Brumfield satisfied §2254(d)(2)'s requirements, he was entitled to have his Atkins claim considered on the merits in federal court. Pp. 6–19.
(a) The two underlying factual determinations on which the state trial court's decision was premised—that Brumfield's IQ score was inconsistent with a diagnosis of intellectual disability and that he presented no evidence of adaptive impairment—were unreasonable under §2254(d)(2). Because that standard is satisfied, the Court need not address §2254(d)(1). Pp. 6–17.
(1) Expert trial testimony that Brumfield scored a 75 on an IQ test is entirely consistent with intellectual disability. Every IQ score has a margin of error. Accounting for that margin of error, the sources on which the Williams court relied in defining subaverage intelligence describe a score of 75 as consistent with an intellectual disability diagnosis. There was no evidence presented to the trial court of any other IQ test that was sufficiently rigorous to preclude the possibility that Brumfield possessed subaverage intelligence. Pp. 8–11.
(2) The state-court record contains sufficient evidence to suggest that Brumfield would meet the criteria for adaptive impairment. Under the test most favorable to the State, an individual like Brumfield must show a "substantial functional limitation" in three of six "areas of major life activity." Williams, 831 So. 2d, at 854. Brumfield—who was placed in special education classes at an early age, was suspected of having a learning disability, and can barely read at a fourth-grade level—would seem to be deficient in two of those areas: "[u]nderstanding and use of language" and "[l]earning." Ibid. His low birth weight, his commitment to mental health facilities at a young age, and officials' administration of antipsychotic and sedative drugs to him at that time all indicate that he may well have had significant deficits in at least one of the remaining four areas. In light of that evidence, the fact that the record contains some contrary evidence cannot be said to foreclose all reasonable doubt as to his intellectual disability. And given that Brumfield's trial occurred before Atkins, the trial court should have taken into account that the evidence before it was sought and introduced at a time when Brumfield's intellectual disability was not at issue. Pp. 11–17.
(b) The State's two additional arguments are rejected. Because the State did not press below the theory that §2254(e)(1) supplies the governing standard when evaluating whether a habeas petitioner has satisfied §2254(d)(2)'s requirements, that issue is not addressed here. And because the state trial court made no finding that Brumfield had failed to produce evidence suggesting he could meet the "manifestations . . . in the developmental stage" requirement for intellectual disability, there is no determination on that point to which a federal court must defer in assessing whether Brumfield satisfied §2254(d). In any event, the state court record contained ample evidence creating a reasonable doubt as to whether Brumfield's disability manifested before adulthood. Pp. 17–18.
744 F. 3d 918, vacated and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in all but Part I–C of which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Alito, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., joined.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Thomas] | Concurrence [Alito] | Concurrence [Breyer] | Concurrence [Kagan] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REED et al. v. TOWN OF GILBERT, ARIZONA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 13–502. Argued January 12, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015
Gilbert, Arizona (Town), has a comprehensive code (Sign Code or Code) that prohibits the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but exempts 23 categories of signs, including three relevant here. "Ideological Signs," defined as signs "communicating a message or ideas" that do not fit in any other Sign Code category, may be up to 20 square feet and have no placement or time restrictions. "Political Signs," defined as signs "designed to influence the outcome of an election," may be up to 32 square feet and may only be displayed during an election season. "Temporary Directional Signs," defined as signs directing the public to a church or other "qualifying event," have even greater restrictions: No more than four of the signs, limited to six square feet, may be on a single property at any time, and signs may be displayed no more than 12 hours before the "qualifying event" and 1 hour after.
Petitioners, Good News Community Church (Church) and its pastor, Clyde Reed, whose Sunday church services are held at various temporary locations in and near the Town, posted signs early each Saturday bearing the Church name and the time and location of the next service and did not remove the signs until around midday Sunday. The Church was cited for exceeding the time limits for displaying temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event date on the signs. Unable to reach an accommodation with the Town, petitioners filed suit, claiming that the Code abridged their freedom of speech. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ultimately concluding that the Code's sign categories were content neutral, and that the Code satisfied the intermediate scrutiny accorded to content-neutral regulations of speech.
Held: The Sign Code's provisions are content-based regulations of speech that do not survive strict scrutiny. Pp. 6–17.
(a) Because content-based laws target speech based on its communicative content, they are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. E.g., R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377 . Speech regulation is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U. S. ___, ___–___. And courts are required to consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face" draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Id., at ___. Whether laws define regulated speech by particular subject matter or by its function or purpose, they are subject to strict scrutiny. The same is true for laws that, though facially content neutral, cannot be " 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,' " or were adopted by the government "because of disagreement with the message" conveyed. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 . Pp. 6–7.
(b) The Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines the categories of temporary, political, and ideological signs on the basis of their messages and then subjects each category to different restrictions. The restrictions applied thus depend entirely on the sign's communicative content. Because the Code, on its face, is a content-based regulation of speech, there is no need to consider the government's justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny. Pp. 7.
(c) None of the Ninth Circuit's theories for its contrary holding is persuasive. Its conclusion that the Town's regulation was not based on a disagreement with the message conveyed skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of "animus toward the ideas contained" in the regulated speech. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410 . Thus, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral. A court must evaluate each question—whether a law is content based on its face and whether the purpose and justification for the law are content based—before concluding that a law is content neutral. Ward does not require otherwise, for its framework applies only to a content-neutral statute.
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Sign Code does not single out any idea or viewpoint for discrimination conflates two distinct but related limitations that the First Amendment places on government regulation of speech. Government discrimination among viewpoints is a "more blatant" and "egregious form of content discrimination," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 , but "[t]he First Amendment 's hostility to content-based regulation [also] extends . . . to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic," Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530 . The Sign Code, a paradigmatic example of content-based discrimination, singles out specific subject matter for differential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter.
The Ninth Circuit also erred in concluding that the Sign Code was not content based because it made only speaker-based and event-based distinctions. The Code's categories are not speaker-based—the restrictions for political, ideological, and temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them. And even if the sign categories were speaker based, that would not automatically render the law content neutral. Rather, "laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622 . This same analysis applies to event-based distinctions. Pp. 8–14.
(d) The Sign Code's content-based restrictions do not survive strict scrutiny because the Town has not demonstrated that the Code's differentiation between temporary directional signs and other types of signs furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. See Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___. Assuming that the Town has a compelling interest in preserving its aesthetic appeal and traffic safety, the Code's distinctions are highly underinclusive. The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town when other types of signs create the same problem. See Discovery Network, supra, at 425. Nor has it shown that temporary directional signs pose a greater threat to public safety than ideological or political signs. Pp. 14–15.
(e) This decision will not prevent governments from enacting effective sign laws. The Town has ample content-neutral options available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics, including regulating size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. And the Town may be able to forbid postings on public property, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789 . An ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers—e.g., warning signs marking hazards on private property or signs directing traffic—might also survive strict scrutiny. Pp. 16–17.
707 F. 3d 1057, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Kennedy and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kagan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Breyer] | Dissent [Alito] |
|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WALKER, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES BOARD, et al. v. TEXAS DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 14–144. Argued March 23, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015
Texas offers automobile owners a choice between general-issue and specialty license plates. Those who want the State to issue a particular specialty plate may propose a plate design, comprising a slogan, a graphic, or both. If the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the State will make it available for display on vehicles registered in Texas. Here, the Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans and its officers (collectively SCV) filed suit against the Chairman and members of the Board (collectively Board), arguing that the Board's rejection of SCV's proposal for a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate battle flag violated the Free Speech Clause. The District Court entered judgment for the Board, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Texas's specialty license plate designs are private speech and that the Board engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination when it refused to approve SCV's design.
Held: Texas's specialty license plate designs constitute government speech, and thus Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring SCV's proposed design. Pp. 5–18.
(a) When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460 –468. A government is generally entitled to promote a program, espouse a policy, or take a position. Were the Free Speech Clause interpreted otherwise, "it is not easy to imagine how government would function." Id., at 468. That is not to say that a government's ability to express itself is without restriction. Constitutional and statutory provisions outside of the Free Speech Clause may limit government speech, and the Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the government's speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the government's speech. Pp. 5–6.
(b) This Court's precedents regarding government speech provide the appropriate framework through which to approach the case. Pp. 6–17.
(1) The same analysis the Court used in Summum—to conclude that a city "accepting a privately donated monument and placing it on city property" was engaging in government speech, 555 U. S., at 464—leads to the conclusion that government speech is at issue here. First, history shows that States, including Texas, have long used license plates to convey government speech, e.g., slogans urging action, promoting tourism, and touting local industries. Cf. id., at 470. Second, Texas license plate designs "are often closely identified in the public mind with the [State]." Id., at 472. Each plate is a government article serving the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification. The governmental nature of the plates is clear from their faces: the State places the name "TEXAS" in large letters across the top of every plate. Texas also requires Texas vehicle owners to display license plates, issues every Texas plate, and owns all of the designs on its plates. The plates are, essentially, government IDs, and ID issuers "typically do not permit" their IDs to contain "message[s] with which they do not wish to be associated," id., at 471. Third, Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates, by giving the Board final approval over each design. Like the city government in Summum, Texas "has effectively controlled the messages [conveyed] by exercising final approval authority over their selection." Id., at 473. These considerations, taken together, show that Texas's specialty plates are similar enough to the monuments in Summum to call for the same result. Pp. 7–12.
(2) Forum analysis, which applies to government restrictions on purely private speech occurring on government property, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788 , is not appropriate when the State is speaking on its own behalf. The parties agree that Texas's specialty license plates are not a traditional public forum. Further, Texas's policies and the nature of its license plates indicate that the State did not intend its specialty plates to serve as either a designated public forum—where "government property . . . not traditionally . . . a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose," Summum, supra, at 469—or a limited public forum—where a government "reserv[es a forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 . The State exercises final authority over the messages that may be conveyed by its specialty plates, it takes ownership of each specialty plate design, and it has traditionally used its plates for government speech. These features of Texas specialty plates militate against a determination that Texas has created a public forum. Finally, the plates are not a nonpublic forum, where the "government is . . . a proprietor, managing its internal operations." International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672 –679. The fact that private parties take part in the design and propagation of a message does not extinguish the governmental nature of the message or transform the government's role into that of a mere forum provider. See Summum, supra, at 470–471. Nor does Texas's requirement that vehicle owners pay annual fees for specialty plates mean that the plates are a forum for private speech. And this case does not resemble other nonpublic forum cases. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 –49; Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 ; and Cornelius, supra, at 804–806, distinguished. Pp. 13–17.
(c) The determination that Texas's specialty license plate designs are government speech does not mean that the designs do not also implicate the free speech rights of private persons. The Court has acknowledged that drivers who display a State's selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 , n. 15. The Court has also recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State's authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey "the State's ideological message," id., at 715, SCV cannot force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates. Pp. 17–18.
759 F. 3d 388, reversed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., joined.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Thomas] | Concurrence [Roberts] |
|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
McFADDEN v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
No. 14–378. Argued April 21, 2015—Decided June 18, 2015
Petitioner McFadden was arrested and charged with distributing controlled substance analogues in violation of the federal Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986 (Analogue Act), which identifies a category of substances substantially similar to those listed on the federal controlled substances schedules, 21 U. S. C. §802(32)(A), and instructs courts to treat those analogues as schedule I controlled substances if they are intended for human consumption, §813. Arguing that he did not know the "bath salts" he was distributing were regulated as controlled substance analogues, McFadden sought an instruction that would have prevented the jury from finding him guilty unless it found that he knew the substances he distributed had chemical structures and effects on the central nervous system substantially similar to those of controlled substances. Instead, the District Court instructed the jury that it need only find that McFadden knowingly and intentionally distributed a substance with substantially similar effects on the central nervous system as a controlled substance and that he intended that substance to be consumed by humans. McFadden was convicted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Analogue Act's intent element required only proof that McFadden intended the substance to be consumed by humans.
Held: When a controlled substance is an analogue, §841(a)(1) requires the Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act or Analogue Act. Pp. 4–11.
(a) In addressing the treatment of controlled substance analogues under federal law, one must look to the CSA, which, as relevant here, makes it "unlawful for any person knowingly . . . to distribute . . . a controlled substance." §841(a)(1). The ordinary meaning of that provision requires a defendant to know only that the substance he is distributing is some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules. Thus, the Government must show either that the defendant knew he was distributing a substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was, or that the defendant knew the identity of the substance he was distributing, even if he did not know it was listed on the schedules.
Because the Analogue Act extends that framework to analogous substances, the CSA's mental-state requirement applies when the controlled substance is, in fact, an analogue. It follows that the Government must prove that a defendant knew that the substance he was distributing was "a controlled substance," even in prosecutions dealing with analogues. That knowledge requirement can be established in two ways: by evidence that a defendant knew that the substance he was distributing is controlled under the CSA or Analogue Act, regardless of whether he knew the substance's identity; or by evidence that the defendant knew the specific analogue he was distributing, even if he did not know its legal status as a controlled substance analogue. A defendant with knowledge of the features defining a substance as a controlled substance analogue, §802(32)(A), knows all of the facts that make his conduct illegal. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The Fourth Circuit did not adhere to §813's command to treat a controlled substance analogue as a controlled substance listed in schedule I by applying §841(a)(1)'s mental-state requirement. Instead, it concluded that the only mental-state requirement for analogue prosecutions is the one in §813—that an analogue be "intended for human consumption." That conclusion is inconsistent with the text and structure of the statutes.
Neither the Government's nor McFadden's interpretation fares any better. The Government's contention that §841(a)(1)'s knowledge requirement as applied to analogues is satisfied if the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under some law ignores §841(a)(1)'s requirement that a defendant know he was dealing with "a controlled substance." That term includes only drugs listed on the federal drug schedules or treated as such by operation of the Analogue Act; it is not broad enough to include all substances regulated by any law. McFadden contends that a defendant must also know the substance's features that cause it to fall within the scope of the Analogue Act. But the key fact that brings a substance within the scope of the Analogue Act is that the substance is "controlled," and that fact can be established in the two ways previously identified. Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 , distinguished. Contrary to McFadden's submission, the canon of constitutional avoidance "has no application" in the interpretation of an unambiguous statute such as this one. Warger v. Shauers, 574 U. S. ___, ___. But even if the statute were ambiguous, the scienter requirement adopted here "alleviate[s] vagueness concerns" under this Court's precedents. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U. S. 124 . Pp. 8–10.
(c) The Government argues that no rational jury could have concluded that McFadden was unaware that the substances he was distributing were controlled under the CSA or Analogue Act and that any error in the jury instruction was therefore harmless. The Fourth Circuit, which did not conduct a harmless-error analysis, is to consider that issue in the first instance. Pp. 10–11.
753 F. 3d 432, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
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