From: "Legal Information Institute [LII]" <Legal_Information_Institute_LII@mail.vresp.com>
Date: Jun 22, 2015 12:32 PM
Subject: Supreme Court Bulletin for Monday, June 22, 2015
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The following information has just arrived via the LII's direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. A list of links for today's material is followed by the syllabus for any case which had one.
Contents
- (062215 Orders)
- LOS ANGELES v. PATEL (13-1175 Syllabus)
- KIMBLE v. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC (13-720 Syllabus)
- KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON (14-6368 Syllabus)
- HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (14-275 Syllabus)
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Sotomayor] | Dissent [Scalia] | Dissent [Alito] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA v. PATEL et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 13–1175. Argued March 3, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015
Petitioner, the city of Los Angeles (City), requires hotel operators to record and keep specific information about their guests on the premises for a 90-day period. Los Angeles Municipal Code §41.49. These records "shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Department for inspection . . . at a time and in a manner that minimizes any interference with the operation of the business," §41.49(3)(a), and a hotel operator's failure to make the records available is a criminal misdemeanor, §11.00(m). Respondents, a group of motel operators and a lodging association, brought a facial challenge to §41.49(3)(a) on Fourth Amendment grounds. The District Court entered judgment for the City, finding that respondents lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in their records. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed, determining that inspections under §41.49(3)(a) are Fourth Amendment searches and that such searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because hotel owners are subjected to punishment for failure to turn over their records without first being afforded the opportunity for precompliance review.
Held:
1. Facial challenges under the Fourth Amendment are not categorically barred or especially disfavored. Pp. 4–8.
(a) Facial challenges to statutes—as opposed to challenges to particular applications of statutes—have been permitted to proceed under a diverse array of constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. ___ ( First Amendment ); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570 ( Second Amendment ). The Fourth Amendment is no exception. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , distinguished. This Court has entertained facial challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless searches, declaring them, on several occasions, facially invalid, see, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305 –309. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Petitioner contends that facial challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless searches must fail because they will never be unconstitutional in all applications, but this Court's precedents demonstrate that such challenges can be brought, and can succeed. Under the proper facial-challenge analysis, only applications of a statute in which the statute actually authorizes or prohibits conduct are considered. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 . When addressing a facial challenge to a statute authorizing warrantless searches, the proper focus is on searches that the law actually authorizes and not those that could proceed irrespective of whether they are authorized by the statute, e.g., where exigent circumstances, a warrant, or consent to search exists. Pp. 7–8.
2. Section 41.49(3)(a) is facially unconstitutional because it fails to provide hotel operators with an opportunity for precompliance review. Pp. 9–17.
(a) " '[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —subject only to a few . . . exceptions.' " Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 . One exception is for administrative searches. See Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 . To be constitutional, the subject of an administrative search must, among other things, be afforded an opportunity to obtain precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker. See See v. Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 . Assuming the administrative search exception otherwise applies here, §41.49 is facially invalid because it fails to afford hotel operators any opportunity for precompliance review. To be clear, a hotel owner must only be afforded an opportunity for precompliance review; actual review need occur only when a hotel operator objects to turning over the records. This opportunity can be provided without imposing onerous burdens on law enforcement. For instance, officers in the field can issue administrative subpoenas without probable cause that a regulation is being infringed. This narrow holding does not call into question those parts of §41.49 requiring hotel operators to keep records nor does it prevent police from obtaining access to those records where a hotel operator consents to the search, where the officer has a proper administrative warrant, or where some other exception to the warrant requirement applies. Pp. 9–13.
(b) Petitioner's argument that the ordinance is facially valid under the more relaxed standard for closely regulated industries is rejected. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 . This Court has only recognized four such industries, and nothing inherent in the operation of hotels poses a comparable clear and significant risk to the public welfare. Additionally, because the majority of regulations applicable to hotels apply to many businesses, to classify hotels as closely regulated would permit what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule. But even if hotels were closely regulated, §41.49 would still contravene the Fourth Amendment as it fails to satisfy the additional criteria that must be met for searches of closely regulated industries to be reasonable. See New York v. Burger, 482 U. S. 691 –703. Pp. 13–17.
738 F. 3d 1058, affirmed.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Kagan] | Dissent [Alito] |
|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KIMBLE et al. v. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, successor to MARVEL ENTERPRISES, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 13–720. Argued March 31, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015
Respondent Marvel Entertainment's corporate predecessor agreed to purchase petitioner Stephen Kimble's patent for a Spider-Man toy in exchange for a lump sum plus a 3% royalty on future sales. The agreement set no end date for royalties. As the patent neared the end of its statutory 20-year term, Marvel discovered Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29 , in which this Court held that a patentee cannot continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires. Marvel then sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court confirming that it could stop paying Kimble royalties. The district court granted relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Kimble now asks this Court to overrule Brulotte.
Held: Stare decisis requires this Court to adhere to Brulotte. Pp. 3–18.
(a) A patent typically expires 20 years from its application date. 35 U. S. C. §154(a)(2). At that point, the unrestricted right to make or use the article passes to the public. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225 . This Court has carefully guarded the significance of that expiration date, declining to enforce laws and contracts that restrict free public access to formerly patented, as well as unpatentable, inventions. See, e.g., id., at 230–233; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U. S. 249 –256.
Brulotte applied that principle to a patent licensing agreement that provided for the payment of royalties accruing after the patent's expiration. 379 U. S., at 30. The Court held that the post-patent royalty provision was "unlawful per se," id., at 30, 32, because it continued "the patent monopoly beyond the [patent] period," id., at 33, and, in so doing, conflicted with patent law's policy of establishing a "post-expiration . . . public domain," ibid.
The Brulotte rule may prevent some parties from entering into deals they desire, but parties can often find ways to achieve similar outcomes. For example, Brulotte leaves parties free to defer payments for pre-expiration use of a patent, tie royalties to non-patent rights, or make non-royalty-based business arrangements. Contending that such alternatives are not enough, Kimble asks this Court to abandon Brulotte's bright-line rule in favor of a case-by-case approach based on antitrust law's "rule of reason." Pp. 3–7.
(b) The doctrine of stare decisis provides that today's Court should stand by yesterday's decisions. Application of that doctrine, though "not an inexorable command," is the "preferred course." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 . Overruling a case always requires "special justification"—over and above the belief "that the precedent was wrongly decided." Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. ___, ___. Where, as here, the precedent interprets a statute, stare decisis carries enhanced force, since critics are free to take their objections to Congress. See e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 –173. Congress, moreover, has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte, see Watson v. United States, 552 U. S. 74 –83, and has even rebuffed bills that would have replaced Brulotte's per se rule with the standard Kimble urges. In addition, Brulotte implicates property and contract law, two contexts in which considerations favoring stare decisis are "at their acme," Payne, 501 U. S., at 828, because parties are especially likely to rely on such precedents when ordering their affairs.
Given those good reasons for adhering to stare decisis in this case, this Court would need a very strong justification for overruling Brulotte. But traditional justifications for abandoning stare decisis do not help Kimble here. First, Brulotte's doctrinal underpinnings have not eroded over time. The patent statute at issue in Brulotte is essentially unchanged. And the precedent on which the Brulotte Court primarily relied, like other decisions enforcing a patent's cut-off date, remains good law. Indeed, Brulotte's close relation to a whole web of precedents means that overruling it could threaten others. Second, nothing about Brulotte has proved unworkable. See Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173. To the contrary, the decision itself is simple to apply—particularly as compared to Kimble's proposed alternative, which can produce high litigation costs and unpredictable results. Pp. 7–12.
(c) Neither of the justifications Kimble offers gives cause to overrule Brulotte. Pp. 12–18.
(1) Kimble first argues the Brulotte hinged on an economic error—i.e., an assumption that post-expiration royalties are always anticompetitive. This Court sees no error in Kimble's economic analysis. But even assuming Kimble is right that Brulotte relied on an economic misjudgment, Congress is the right entity to fix it. The patent laws are not like the Sherman Act, which gives courts exceptional authority to shape the law and reconsider precedent based on better economic analysis. Moreover, Kimble's argument is based not on evolving economic theory but rather on a claim that the Brulotte Court simply made the wrong call. That claim fails to clear stare decisis's high bar. In any event, Brulotte did not even turn on the notion that post-patent royalties harm competition. Instead, the Brulotte Court simply applied the categorical principle that all patent-related benefits must end when the patent term expires. Kimble's real complaint may go to the merits of that principle as a policy matter. But Congress, not this Court, gets to make patent policy. Pp. 12–16.
(2) Kimble also argues that Brulotte suppresses technological innovation and harms the national economy by preventing parties from reaching agreements to commercialize patents. This Court cannot tell whether that is true. Brulotte leaves parties free to enter alternative arrangements that may suffice to accomplish parties' payment deferral and risk-spreading goals. And neither Kimble nor his amici offer any empirical evidence connecting Brulotte to decreased innovation. In any event, claims about a statutory precedent's consequences for innovation are "more appropriately addressed to Congress." Halliburton, 573 U. S., at ___. Pp. 16–18.
727 F. 3d 856, affirmed.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined.
Top
| Syllabus | Opinion [Breyer] | Dissent [Scalia] | Dissent [Alito] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
No. 14–6368. Argued April 27, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015
While petitioner Kingsley was awaiting trial in county jail, officers forcibly removed him from his cell when he refused to comply with their instructions. Kingsley filed a complaint in Federal District Court claiming, as relevant here, that two of the officers used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 's Due Process Clause. At the trial's conclusion, the District Court instructed the jury that Kingsley was required to prove, inter alia, that the officers "recklessly disregarded [Kingsley's] safety" and "acted with reckless disregard of [his] rights." The jury found in the officers' favor. On appeal, Kingsley argued that the jury instruction did not adhere to the proper standard for judging a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim, namely, objective unreasonableness. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the law required a subjective inquiry into the officers' state of mind, i.e., whether the officers actually intended to violate, or recklessly disregarded, Kingsley's rights.
Held:
1. Under 42 U. S. C. §1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable to prevail on an excessive force claim. Pp. 5–13.
(a) This determination must be made from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 , and must account for the "legitimate interests [stemming from the government's] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained," appropriately deferring to "policies and practices that in th[e] judgment" of jail officials "are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 540, 547. Pp. 5–7.
(b) Several considerations lead to this conclusion. An objective standard is consistent with precedent. In Bell, for instance, this Court held that a pretrial detainee could prevail on a claim that his due process rights were violated by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it was excessive in relation to that purpose. 441 U. S., at 541–543. Cf. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U. S. 576 –586. Experience also suggests that an objective standard is workable. It is consistent with the pattern jury instructions used in several Circuits, and many facilities train officers to interact with detainees as if the officers' conduct is subject to objective reasonableness. Finally, the use of an objective standard adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith, e.g., by acknowledging that judging the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer is an appropriate part of the analysis. Pp. 7–10.
(c) None of the cases respondents point to provides significant support for a subjective standard. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312 , and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 , lack relevance in this context because they involved claims brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment 's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, not claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment 's Due Process Clause. And in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833 , a statement indicating the need to show "purpose to cause harm," id., at 854, for due process liability refers not to whether the force intentionally used was excessive, but whether the defendant intended to commit the acts in question, id., at 854, and n. 13. Finally, in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028 (CA2), a malicious-and-sadistic-purpose-to-cause-harm factor was not suggested as a necessary condition for liability, but as a factor, among others, that might help show that the use of force was excessive. Pp. 10–13.
2. Applying the proper standard, the jury instruction was erroneous. Taken together, the features of that instruction suggested that the jury should weigh respondents' subjective reasons for using force and subjective views about the excessiveness of that force. Respondents' claim that, irrespective of this Court's holding, any error in the instruction was harmless is left to the Seventh Circuit to resolve on remand. Pp. 13–14.
744 F. 3d 443, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Roberts] | Concurrence [Thomas] | Concurrence [Breyer] | Dissent [Sotomayor] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HORNE et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 14–275. Argued April 22, 2015—Decided June 22, 2015
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate "marketing orders" to help maintain stable markets for particular agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee that imposes a reserve requirement—a requirement that growers set aside a certain percentage of their crop for the account of the Government, free of charge. The Government makes use of those raisins by selling them in noncompetitive markets, donating them, or disposing of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting the Government's expenses from administering the program, the net proceeds are distributed back to the raisin growers. In 2002–2003, raisin growers were required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop under the reserve requirement. In 2003–2004, 30 percent. Marvin Horne, Laura Horne, and their family are raisin growers who refused to set aside any raisins for the Government on the ground that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The Government fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins as well as additional civil penalties for their failure to obey the raisin marketing order.
The Hornes sought relief in federal court, arguing that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property under the Fifth Amendment . On remand from this Court over the issue of jurisdiction, Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U. S. ___, the Ninth Circuit held that the reserve requirement was not a Fifth Amendment taking. The court determined that the requirement was not a per se taking because personal property is afforded less protection under the Takings Clause than real property and because the Hornes, who retained an interest in any net proceeds, were not completely divested of their property. The Ninth Circuit held that, as in cases allowing the government to set conditions on land use and development, the Government imposed a condition (the reserve requirement) in exchange for a Government benefit (an orderly raisin market). It held that the Hornes could avoid relinquishing large percentages of their crop by "planting different crops." 730 F. 3d 1128, 1143.
Held: The Fifth Amendment requires that the Government pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. Any net proceeds the raisin growers receive from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation they have received for that taking—it does not mean the raisins have not been appropriated for Government use. Nor can the Government make raisin growers relinquish their property without just compensation as a condition of selling their raisins in interstate commerce. Pp. 4–18.
(a) The Fifth Amendment applies to personal property as well as real property. The Government has a categorical duty to pay just compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home. Pp. 4–9.
(1) This principle, dating back as far as Magna Carta, was codified in the Takings Clause in part because of property appropriations by both sides during the Revolutionary War. This Court has noted that an owner of personal property may expect that new regulation of the use of property could "render his property economically worthless." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003 –1028. But there is still a "longstanding distinction" between regulations concerning the use of property and government acquisition of property. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302 . When it comes to physical appropriations, people do not expect their property, real or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away. Pp. 4–8.
(2) The reserve requirement imposed by the Raisin Committee is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred from the growers to the Government. Title to the raisins passes to the Raisin Committee. The Committee disposes of those raisins as it wishes, to promote the purposes of the raisin marketing order. The Government's formal demand that the Hornes turn over a percentage of their raisin crop without charge, for the Government's control and use, is "of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 . Pp. 8–9.
(b) The fact that the growers are entitled to the net proceeds of the raisin sales does not mean that there has been no taking at all. When there has been a physical appropriation, "we do not ask . . . whether it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use" of the item taken. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, 535 U. S., at 323. The fact that the growers retain a contingent interest of indeterminate value does not mean there has been no taking, particularly when that interest depends on the discretion of the taker, and may be worthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51 , distinguished. Once there is a taking, as in the case of a physical appropriation, any payment from the Government in connection with that action goes, at most, to the question of just compensation. Pp. 9–12.
(c) The taking in this case also cannot be characterized as part of a voluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. In one of the years at issue, the Government insisted that the Hornes part with 47 percent of their crop for the privilege of selling the rest. But the ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, although certainly subject to reasonable government regulation, is not a "benefit" that the Government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986 , distinguished. Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U. S. 392 , distinguished. Pp. 12–14.
(d) The Hornes are not required to first pay the fine and then seek compensation under the Tucker Act. See Horne, 569 U. S., at ___. Because they have the full economic interest in the raisins the Government alleges should have been set aside for its account—i.e., they own the raisins they grew as well as the raisins they handled, having paid the growers for all of their raisins, not just their free-tonnage raisins—they may raise a takings-based defense to the fine levied against them. There is no need for the Ninth Circuit to calculate the just compensation due on remand. The clear and administrable rule is that "just compensation normally is to be measured by 'the market value of the property at the time of the taking.' " United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U. S. 24 . Here, the Government already calculated that amount when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins. Pp. 14–18.
750 F. 3d 1128, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined as to Parts I and II. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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