From: "Legal Information Institute [LII]" <Legal_Information_Institute_LII@mail.vresp.com>
Date: Jun 15, 2015 11:51 AM
Subject: Supreme Court Bulletin for Monday, June 15, 2015
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The following information has just arrived via the LII's direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. A list of links for today's material is followed by the syllabus for any case which had one.
Contents
- (061515 Orders)
- HITTSON v. CHATMAN (14-8589 Concurrence)
- KERRY v. DIN (13-1402 Syllabus)
- BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC (14-103 Syllabus)
- REYES MATA v. LYNCH (14-185 Syllabus)
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Scalia] | Concurrence [Kennedy] | Dissent [Breyer] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, et al. v. DIN
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 13–1402. Argued February 23, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015
Respondent Fauzia Din petitioned to have her husband, Kanishka Berashk, a resident citizen of Afghanistan and former civil servant in the Taliban regime, classified as an "immediate relative" entitled to priority immigration status. Din's petition was approved, but Berashk's visa application was ultimately denied. A consular officer informed Berashk that he was inadmissible under §1182(a)(3)(B), which excludes aliens who have engaged in "[t]errorist activities," but the officer provided no further information. Unable to obtain a more detailed explanation for Berashk's visa denial, Din filed suit in Federal District Court, which dismissed her complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Din had a protected liberty interest in her marriage that entitled her to review of the denial of Berashk's visa. It further held that the Government deprived her of that liberty interest without due process when it denied Berashk's visa application without providing a more detailed explanation of its reasons.
Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.
718 F. 3d 856, vacated and remanded.
Justice Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, concluded that the Government did not deprive Din of any constitutional right entitling her to due process of law. Pp. 3–15.
(a) Under a historical understanding of the Due Process Clause, Din cannot possibly claim that the denial of Berashk's visa application deprived her of life, liberty, or property. Pp. 4–5.
(b) Even accepting the textually unsupportable doctrine of implied fundamental rights, nothing in that line of cases establishes a free-floating and categorical liberty interest sufficient to trigger constitutional protection whenever a regulation touches upon any aspect of the marital relationship. Even if those cases could be so broadly construed, the relevant question is not whether the asserted interest "is consistent with this Court's substantive-due-process line of cases," but whether it is supported by "this Nation's history and practice," Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702 –724. Here, the Government's long practice of regulating immigration, which has included erecting serious impediments to a person's ability to bring a spouse into the United States, precludes Din's claim. And this Court has consistently recognized its lack of "judicial authority to substitute [its] political judgment for that of Congress" with regard to the various distinctions in immigration policy. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787 . Pp. 5–11.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, concluded that there is no need to decide whether Din has a protected liberty interest, because, even assuming she does, the notice she received satisfied due process. Pp. 1–6.
(a) This conclusion is dictated by the reasoning of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753 . There the Court declined to balance the asserted First Amendment interest of college professors seeking a nonimmigrant visa for a revolutionary Marxist speaker against "Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens,' " id., at 766, and limited its inquiry to whether the Government had provided a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for its action, id., at 770. Mandel's reasoning has particular force here, where national security is involved. Pp. 2–3.
(b) Assuming that Din's rights were burdened directly by the visa denial, the consular officer's citation of §1182(a)(3)(B) satisfies Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard. Given Congress' plenary power to "suppl[y] the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States," United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 , the Government's decision to exclude Berashk because he did not satisfy a statutory condition for admissibility is facially legitimate. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that, by Din's own admission, Berashk worked for the Taliban government. These considerations lend to the conclusion that there was a bona fide factual basis for exclusion, absent an affirmative showing of bad faith on the consular officer's part, which Din has not plausibly alleged. Pp. 4–6.
Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Alito, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Thomas] | Concurrence [Sotomayor] | Dissent [Breyer] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. et al. v. ASARCO LLC
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 14–103. Argued February 25, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015
Respondent ASARCO LLC hired petitioner law firms pursuant to §327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to assist it in carrying out its duties as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession. See 11 U. S. C. §327(a). When ASARCO emerged from bankruptcy, the law firms filed fee applications requesting fees under §330(a)(1), which permits bankruptcy courts to "award . . . reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by" §327(a) professionals. ASARCO challenged the applications, but the Bankruptcy Court rejected ASARCO's objections and awarded the law firms fees for time spent defending the applications. ASARCO appealed to the District Court, which held that the law firms could be awarded fees for defending their fee applications. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that §330(a)(1) did not authorize fee awards for defending fee applications.
Held: Section §330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award fees to §327(a) professionals for defending fee applications. Pp. 3–13.
(a) The American Rule provides the " 'basic point of reference' " for awards of attorney's fees: " 'Each litigant pays his own attorney's fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.' " Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242 –253. Because the rule is deeply rooted in the common law, see, e.g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306, this Court will not deviate from it " 'absent explicit statutory authority,' " Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598 . Departures from the American Rule have been recognized only in "specific and explicit provisions," Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240 , usually containing language that authorizes the award of "a reasonable attorney's fee," "fees," or "litigation costs," and referring to a "prevailing party" in the context of an adversarial "action," see generally Hardt, supra, at 253, and nn. 3–7. Pp. 3–4.
(b) Congress did not depart from the American Rule in §330(a)(1) for fee-defense litigation. Section 327(a) professionals are hired to serve an estate's administrator for the benefit of the estate, and §330(a)(1) authorizes "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered." The word "services" ordinarily refers to "labor performed for another," Webster's New International Dictionary 2288. Thus, the phrase " 'reasonable compensation for services rendered' necessarily implies loyal and disinterested service in the interest of" a client, Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 312 U. S. 262 . Time spent litigating a fee application against the bankruptcy estate's administrator cannot be fairly described as "labor performed for"—let alone "disinterested service to"—that administrator. Had Congress wished to shift the burdens of fee-defense litigation under §330(a)(1), it could have done so, as it has done in other Bankruptcy Code provisions, e.g., §110(i)(1)(C). Pp. 4–7.
(c) Neither the law firms nor the United States, as amicus curiae, offers a persuasive theory for why §330(a)(1) should override the American Rule in this context. Pp. 7–13.
(1) The law firms' view—that fee-defense litigation is part of the "services rendered" to the estate administrator—not only suffers from an unnatural interpretation of the term "services rendered," but would require a particularly unusual deviation from the American Rule, as it would permit attorneys to be awarded fees for unsuccessfully defending fee applications when most fee-shifting provisions permit awards only to "a 'prevailing party,' " Hardt, supra, at 253. Pp. 7–8.
(2) The Government's argument is also unpersuasive. Its theory—that fees for fee-defense litigation must be understood as a component of the "reasonable compensation for [the underlying] services rendered" so that compensation for the "actual . . . services rendered" will not be diluted by unpaid time spent litigating fees—cannot be reconciled with the relevant text. Section 330(a)(1) does not authorize courts to award "reasonable compensation," but "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered," and the Government properly concedes that litigation in defense of a fee application is not a "service." And §330(a)(6), which presupposes compensation "for the preparation of a fee application," does not suggest that time spent defending a fee application must also be compensable. Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U. S. 154 , distinguished.
The Government's theory ultimately rests on the flawed policy argument that a "judicial exception" is needed to compensate fee-defense litigation and safeguard Congress' aim of ensuring that talented attorneys take on bankruptcy work. But since no attorneys are entitled to such fees absent express statutory authorization, requiring bankruptcy attorneys to bear the costs of their fee-defense litigation under §330(a)(1) creates no disincentive to bankruptcy practice. And even if this Court believed that uncompensated fee-defense litigation would fall particularly hard on the bankruptcy bar, it has no "roving authority . . . to allow counsel fees . . . whenever [it] might deem them warranted," Alyeska Pipeline, supra, at 260. Pp. 8–13.
751 F. 3d 291, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Sotomayor, J., joined as to all but Part III–B–2. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Kagan, JJ., joined.
Top
| Syllabus | Opinion [Kagan] | Dissent [Thomas] |
|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REYES MATA v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
No. 14–185. Argued April 29, 2015—Decided June 15, 2015
After petitioner Noel Reyes Mata, an unlawful resident alien, was convicted of assault in a Texas court, an Immigration Judge ordered him removed to Mexico. Mata's attorney filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), but never filed a brief, and the appeal was dismissed. Acting through different counsel, Mata filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings, as authorized by statute. See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). Acknowledging that he had missed the 90-day deadline for such motions, see §1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), Mata argued that his previous counsel's ineffective assistance was an exceptional circumstance entitling him to equitable tolling of the time limit. But the BIA disagreed and dismissed the motion as untimely. The BIA also declined to reopen Mata's removal proceedings sua sponte based on its separate regulatory authority. See 8 CFR §1003.2(a). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit construed Mata's equitable tolling claim as an invitation for the Board to exercise its regulatory authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, and—because circuit precedent forbids the court to review BIA decisions not to exercise that authority—dismissed Mata's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Held: The Fifth Circuit erred in declining to take jurisdiction over Mata's appeal. A court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the BIA's rejection of an alien's motion to reopen. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233 . Nothing about that jurisdiction changes where the Board rejects a motion as untimely, or when it rejects a motion requesting equitable tolling of the time limit. That jurisdiction likewise remains unchanged if the BIA's denial also contains a separate decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority. So even assuming the Fifth Circuit is correct that courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review BIA decisions not to reopen cases sua sponte, that lack of jurisdiction does not affect jurisdiction over the decision on the alien's motion to reopen. It thus follows that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over this case.
The Fifth Circuit's contrary decision rested on its construing Mata's motion as an invitation for the Board to exercise its sua sponte discretion. Court-appointed amicus asserts that the Fifth Circuit's recharacterization was based on the premise that equitable tolling in Mata's situation is categorically forbidden. In amicus's view, the court's construal was therefore an example of the ordinary practice of recharacterizing a doomed request as one for relief that may be available. But even if equitable tolling is prohibited, the Fifth Circuit's action was not justified. If Mata is not entitled to relief on the merits, then the correct disposition is to take jurisdiction and affirm the BIA's denial of his motion. For a court retains jurisdiction even if a litigant's request for relief lacks merit, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 , and a federal court has a "virtually unflagging obligation," Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800 , to assert jurisdiction where it has that authority. Nor can the established practice of recharacterizing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of relief justify an approach that, as here, renders relief impossible and sidesteps the judicial obligation to assert jurisdiction. Pp. 4–8.
558 Fed. Appx. 366, reversed and remanded.
Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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