From: "Legal Information Institute [LII]" <Legal_Information_Institute_LII@mail.vresp.com>
Date: Jun 29, 2015 12:04 PM
Subject: Supreme Court Bulletin for Monday, June 29
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The following information has just arrived via the LII's direct Project HERMES feed from the Supreme Court. A list of links for today's material is followed by the syllabus for any case which had one.
Contents
- ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA (13-1314 Syllabus)
- MICHIGAN v. EPA (14-46 Syllabus)
- GLOSSIP v. GROSS (14-7955 Syllabus)
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Ginsburg] | Dissent [Roberts] | Dissent [Scalia] | Dissent [Thomas] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION et al.
appeal from the united states district court for the district of arizona
No. 13–1314. Argued March 2, 2015—Decided June 29, 2015
Under Arizona's Constitution, the electorate shares lawmaking authority on equal footing with the Arizona Legislature. The voters may adopt laws and constitutional amendments by ballot initiative, and they may approve or disapprove, by referendum, measures passed by the Legislature. Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 1, §1. "Any law which may be enacted by the Legislature . . . may be enacted by the people under the Initiative." Art. XXII, §14.
In 2000, Arizona voters adopted Proposition 106, an initiative aimed at the problem of gerrymandering. Proposition 106 amended Arizona's Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the Arizona Legislature and vesting it in an independent commission, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC). After the 2010 census, as after the 2000 census, the AIRC adopted redistricting maps for congressional as well as state legislative districts. The Arizona Legislature challenged the map the Commission adopted in 2012 for congressional districts, arguing that the AIRC and its map violated the "Elections Clause" of the U. S. Constitution, which provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." Because "Legislature" means the State's representative assembly, the Arizona Legislature contended, the Clause precludes resort to an independent commission, created by initiative, to accomplish redistricting. A three-judge District Court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected its complaint on the merits.
Held:
1. The Arizona Legislature has standing to bring this suit. In claiming that Proposition 106 stripped it of its alleged constitutional prerogative to engage in redistricting and that its injury would be remedied by a court order enjoining the proposition's enforcement, the Legislature has shown injury that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent,' " Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43 , "fairly traceable to the challenged action," and "redressable by a favorable ruling," Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. ___, ___. Specifically, Proposition 106, together with the Arizona Constitution's ban on efforts by the Arizona Legislature to undermine the purposes of an initiative, would "completely nullif[y]" any vote by the Legislature, now or "in the future," purporting to adopt a redistricting plan. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811 –824. Pp. 9–15.
2. The Elections Clause and 2 U. S. C. §2a(c) permit Arizona's use of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Pp. 15–35.
(a) Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum, Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 , and the Governor's veto, Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 . While exercise of the initiative was not at issue in this Court's prior decisions, there is no constitutional barrier to a State's empowerment of its people by embracing that form of lawmaking. Pp. 15–19.
(b) Title 2 U. S. C. §2a(c)—which provides that, "[u]ntil a State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any apportionment," it must follow federally prescribed redistricting procedures—permits redistricting in accord with Arizona's initiative. From 1862 through 1901, apportionment Acts required a State to follow federal procedures unless "the [state] legislature" drew district lines. In 1911, Congress, recognizing that States had supplemented the representative legislature mode of lawmaking with a direct lawmaking role for the people, replaced the reference to redistricting by the state "legislature" with a reference to redistricting of a State "in the manner provided by the laws thereof." §4, 37 Stat. 14. The Act's legislative history "leaves no . . . doubt," Hildebrant, 241 U. S., at 568, that the change was made to safeguard to "each state full authority to employ in the creation of congressional districts its own laws and regulations." 47 Cong. Rec. 3437. "If they include the initiative, it is included." Id., at 3508. Congress used virtually identical language in enacting §2a(c) in 1941. This provision also accords full respect to the redistricting procedures adopted by the States. Thus, so long as a State has "redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof"—as Arizona did by utilizing the independent commission procedure in its Constitution—the resulting redistricting plan becomes the presumptively governing map.
Though four of §2a(c)'s five default redistricting procedures—operative only when a State is not "redistricted in the manner provided by [state] law"—have become obsolete as a result of this Court's decisions embracing the one-person, one-vote principle, this infirmity does not bear on the question whether a State has been "redistricted in the manner provided by [state] law." Pp. 19–23.
(c) The Elections Clause permits the people of Arizona to provide for redistricting by independent commission. The history and purpose of the Clause weigh heavily against precluding the people of Arizona from creating a commission operating independently of the state legislature to establish congressional districts. Such preclusion would also run up against the Constitution's animating principle that the people themselves are the originating source of all the powers of government. Pp. 24–35.
(1) The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the historical record bears out, was to empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way States enact legislation. See Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U. S., at ___. Ratification arguments in support of congressional oversight focused on potential abuses by state politicians, but the legislative processes by which the States could exercise their initiating role in regulating congressional elections occasioned no debate. Pp. 25–27.
(2) There is no suggestion that the Election Clause, by specifying "the Legislature thereof," required assignment of congressional redistricting authority to the State's representative body. It is characteristic of the federal system that States retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the Federal Government. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706 . "Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 . Arizona engaged in definition of that kind when its people placed both the initiative power and the AIRC's redistricting authority in the portion of the Arizona Constitution delineating the State's legislative authority, Ariz. Const., Art. IV. The Elections Clause should not be read to single out federal elections as the one area in which States may not use citizen initiatives as an alternative legislative process. And reading the Clause to permit the use of the initiative to control state and local elections but not federal elections would "deprive several States of the convenience of having the elections for their own governments and for the national government" held at the same times and places, and in the same manner. The Federalist No. 61, p. 374 (Hamilton). Pp. 27–30.
(3) The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people's legislative power is coextensive with the state legislature's authority, but the invention of the initiative was in full harmony with the Constitution's conception of the people as the font of governmental power. It would thus be perverse to interpret "Legislature" in the Elections Clause to exclude lawmaking by the people, particularly when such lawmaking is intended to advance the prospect that Members of Congress will in fact be "chosen . . . by the People of the several States," Art. I, §2. Pp. 30–33.
(4) Banning lawmaking by initiative to direct a State's method of apportioning congressional districts would not just stymie attempts to curb gerrymandering. It would also cast doubt on numerous other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elections that States have adopted by the initiative method. As well, it could endanger election provisions in state constitutions adopted by conventions and ratified by voters at the ballot box, without involvement or approval by "the Legislature." Pp. 33–35.
997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Scalia] | Concurrence [Thomas] | Dissent [Kagan] |
|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
MICHIGAN et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit1
No. 14–46. Argued March 25, 2015—Decided June 29, 2015
The Clean Air Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from certain stationary sources (such as refineries and factories). 42 U. S. C. §7412. The Agency may regulate power plants under this program only if it concludes that "regulation is appropriate and necessary" after studying hazards to public health posed by power-plant emissions. §7412(n)(1)(A). Here, EPA found power-plant regulation "appropriate" because the plants' emissions pose risks to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing these emissions were available. It found regulation "necessary" because the imposition of other Clean Air Act requirements did not eliminate those risks. The Agency refused to consider cost when making its decision. It estimated, however, that the cost of its regulations to power plants would be $9.6 billion a year, but the quantifiable benefits from the resulting reduction in hazardous-air-pollutant emissions would be $4 to $6 million a year. Petitioners (including 23 States) sought review of EPA's rule in the D. C. Circuit, which upheld the Agency's refusal to consider costs in its decision to regulate.
Held: EPA interpreted §7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. Pp. 5–15.
(a) Agency action is unlawful if it does not rest " 'on a consideration of the relevant factors.' " Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 . Even under the deferential standard of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 , which directs courts to accept an agency's reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers, id., at 842–843, EPA strayed well beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation in concluding that cost is not a factor relevant to the appropriateness of regulating power plants. Pp. 5–6.
(b) "Appropriate and necessary" is a capacious phrase. Read naturally against the backdrop of established administrative law, this phrase plainly encompasses cost. It is not rational, never mind "appropriate," to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. Statutory context supports this reading. Section 7412(n)(1) required the EPA to conduct three studies, including one that reflects concern about cost, see §7412(n)(1)(B); and the Agency agrees that the term "appropriate and necessary" must be interpreted in light of all three studies. Pp. 6–9.
(c) EPA's counterarguments are unpersuasive. That other Clean Air Act provisions expressly mention cost only shows that §7412(n)(1)(A)'s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors, one of which is cost. Similarly, the modest principle of Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457 —when the Clean Air Act expressly directs EPA to regulate on the basis of a discrete factor that does not include cost, the Act should not be read as implicitly allowing consideration of cost anyway—has no bearing on this case. Furthermore, the possibility of considering cost at a later stage, when deciding how much to regulate power plants, does not establish its irrelevance at this stage. And although the Clean Air Act makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants, the whole point of having a separate provision for power plants was to treat power plants differently. Pp. 9–12.
(d) EPA must consider cost—including cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation) how to account for cost. Pp. 12–15.
748 F. 3d 1222, reversed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined.
Notes
1Together with No. 14–47, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., and No. 14–49, National Mining Assn. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
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| Syllabus | Opinion [Alito] | Concurrence [Scalia] | Concurrence [Thomas] | Dissent [Breyer] | Dissent [Sotomayor] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
GLOSSIP et al. v. GROSS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
No. 14–7955. Argued April 29, 2015—Decided June 29, 2015
Because capital punishment is constitutional, there must be a constitutional means of carrying it out. After Oklahoma adopted lethal injection as its method of execution, it settled on a three-drug protocol of (1) sodium thiopental (a barbiturate) to induce a state of unconsciousness, (2) a paralytic agent to inhibit all muscular-skeletal movements, and (3) potassium chloride to induce cardiac arrest. In Baze v. Rees, 553 U. S. 35 , the Court held that this protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment 's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Anti-death-penalty advocates then pressured pharmaceutical companies to prevent sodium thiopental (and, later, another barbiturate called pentobarbital) from being used in executions. Unable to obtain either sodium thiopental or pentobarbital, Oklahoma decided to use a 500-milligram dose of midazolam, a sedative, as the first drug in its three-drug protocol.
Oklahoma death-row inmates filed a 42 U. S. C. §1983 action claiming that the use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment . Four of those inmates filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and argued that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam will not render them unable to feel pain associated with administration of the second and third drugs. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion. It held that the prisoners failed to identify a known and available alternative method of execution that presented a substantially less severe risk of pain. It also held that the prisoners failed to establish a likelihood of showing that the use of midazolam created a demonstrated risk of severe pain. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Petitioners have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 11–29.
(a) To obtain a preliminary injunction, petitioners must establish, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7 . To succeed on an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim, a prisoner must establish that the method creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain and that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives. Baze, supra, at 61 (plurality opinion). Pp. 11–13.
(b) Petitioners failed to establish that any risk of harm was substantial when compared to a known and available alternative method of execution. Petitioners have suggested that Oklahoma could execute them using sodium thiopental or pentobarbital, but the District Court did not commit a clear error when it found that those drugs are unavailable to the State. Petitioners argue that the Eighth Amendment does not require them to identify such an alternative, but their argument is inconsistent with the controlling opinion in Baze, which imposed a requirement that the Court now follows. Petitioners also argue that the requirement to identify an alternative is inconsistent with the Court's pre-Baze decision in Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573 , but they misread that decision. Hill concerned a question of civil procedure, not a substantive Eighth Amendment question. That case held that §1983 alone does not require an inmate asserting a method-of-execution claim to plead an acceptable alternative. Baze, on the other hand, made clear that the Eighth Amendment requires a prisoner to plead and prove a known and available alternative. Pp. 13–16.
(c) The District Court did not commit clear error when it found that midazolam is likely to render a person unable to feel pain associated with administration of the paralytic agent and potassium chloride. Pp. 16–29.
(1) Several initial considerations bear emphasis. First, the District Court's factual findings are reviewed under the deferential "clear error" standard. Second, petitioners have the burden of persuasion on the question whether midazolam is effective. Third, the fact that numerous courts have concluded that midazolam is likely to render an inmate insensate to pain during execution heightens the deference owed to the District Court's findings. Finally, challenges to lethal injection protocols test the boundaries of the authority and competency of federal courts, which should not embroil themselves in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise. Baze, supra, at 51. Pp. 16–18.
(2) The State's expert presented persuasive testimony that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam would make it a virtual certainty that an inmate will not feel pain associated with the second and third drugs, and petitioners' experts acknowledged that they had no contrary scientific proof. Expert testimony presented by both sides lends support to the District Court's conclusion. Evidence suggested that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam will induce a coma, and even one of petitioners' experts agreed that as the dose of midazolam increases, it is expected to produce a lack of response to pain. It is not dispositive that midazolam is not recommended or approved for use as the sole anesthetic during painful surgery. First, the 500-milligram dose at issue here is many times higher than a normal therapeutic dose. Second, the fact that a low dose of midazolam is not the best drug for maintaining unconsciousness says little about whether a 500-milligram dose is constitutionally adequate to conduct an execution. Finally, the District Court did not err in concluding that the safeguards adopted by Oklahoma to ensure proper administration of midazolam serve to minimize any risk that the drug will not operate as intended. Pp. 18–22.
(3) Petitioners' speculative evidence regarding midazolam's "ceiling effect" does not establish that the District Court's findings were clearly erroneous. The mere fact that midazolam has a ceiling above which an increase in dosage produces no effect cannot be dispositive, and petitioners provided little probative evidence on the relevant question, i.e., whether midazolam's ceiling effect occurs below the level of a 500-milligram dose and at a point at which the drug does not have the effect of rendering a person insensate to pain caused by the second and third drugs. Petitioners attempt to deflect attention from their failure of proof on this point by criticizing the testimony of the State's expert. They emphasize an apparent conflict between the State's expert and their own expert regarding the biological process that produces midazolam's ceiling effect. But even if petitioners' expert is correct regarding that biological process, it is largely beside the point. What matters for present purposes is the dosage at which the ceiling effect kicks in, not the biological process that produces the effect. Pp. 22–25.
(4) Petitioners' remaining arguments—that an expert report presented in the District Court should have been rejected because it referenced unreliable sources and contained an alleged mathematical error, that only four States have used midazolam in an execution, and that difficulties during two recent executions suggest that midazolam is ineffective—all lack merit. Pp. 26–29.
776 F. 3d 721, affirmed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined.
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