Court Ruling on Coin's and the "Gatekeeper" still undecided to Perea vs. Bush, etal,, concern is over the use of Entrance of Third Party still Pending

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROY LANGBORD, et al., :
Plaintiffs, : CIVIL ACTION
 :
v. :
 :
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF :
THE TREASURY, et al., : NO. 06-CV-05315
Defendants. :
Legrome D. Davis, J. May 7, 2009
MEMORANDUM
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This litigation arises out of a dispute over ten 1933 Double Eagle gold coins. In August
2004, Plaintiffs Roy, Joan and David Langbord, acting through their counsel Barry Berke
(“Berke”), contacted officials of the United States Mint to inform them that they had discovered
the Double Eagles in a family safety deposit box in Philadelphia. According to Plaintiffs, the
coins had belonged to their late family member, Israel Switt (“Switt”), and passed to Plaintiffs
following the deaths of Switt and his wife. On September 22, 2004, Plaintiff Roy Langbord,
accompanied by Berke, opened the safe deposit box and turned the coins over to Mint officials.
The parties disagree over the purpose and legal effect of that event. In June 2005, Mint officials
informed Plaintiffs that the Mint would not be returning the coins to them. The Mint and the
United States Department of the Treasury rejected Plaintiffs’ subsequent demands for return of
the coins based on the agencies’ determination that the coins had been stolen from the United
States Government. In December 2006, Plaintiffs instituted this civil action against Defendants
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Case 2:06-cv-05315-LDD Document 96 Filed 05/11/09 Page 1 of 19the United States Department of the Treasury, the United States Mint, and numerous
governmental officials, alleging, in part, causes of action for conversion, violations of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, and violations of
Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
One of the questions in this case that may become significant at trial is whether the ten
1933 Double Eagle coins at issue were obtained legally from the United States Mint or the
Department of Treasury. Both sets of parties have sought to introduce expert testimony that
bears on that question. Plaintiffs’ proposed expert witness, David Bowers (“Bowers”), is an
established professional numismatist and author who has written on the history of coins,
including the history of Double Eagles. Bowers’s expert report offers the opinion that the coins
could have been obtained by a member of the public directly from the United States Mint or the
Department of Treasury pursuant to those agencies’ practices and policies in place at the relevant
time. Defendants’ proposed expert witness, David Tripp (“Tripp”), is also an established
professional numismatist and has also written works on the history of coins, including the history
of the 1933 Double Eagles. Tripp’s expert report concludes that the 1933 Double Eagles at issue
were never officially released from the United States Mint.
Plaintiffs have moved to exclude Tripp’s expert opinion, and Defendants have moved to
exclude Bowers’s expert opinion. We consider the admissibility of each expert’s opinion below.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standards for Admission of Expert Testimony
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Court must act as a “gatekeeper” to ensure
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Case 2:06-cv-05315-LDD Document 96 Filed 05/11/09 Page 2 of 19that “all expert testimony or evidence is not only relevant, but also reliable.” Pineda v. Ford
Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). In so doing, however, we must keep in mind that
the Rules of Evidence “embody a strong preference for admitting any evidence that may assist
the trier of fact” and have “a liberal policy of admissibility” with respect to expert testimony. Id.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, has three 1
major requirements:
(1) the proffered witness must be an expert, i.e., must be qualified; (2)
the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or
specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert’s testimony must assist the
trier of fact.
Id. at 244 (internal citations omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
summarized these requirements as “a trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification,
reliability and fit.” Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003)